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EMBARGO OR BLOCKADE?
THE LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS OF THE
U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON CUBA
BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL*
I. Introduction
Cuba is always an interesting topic of conversation, regardless
of where one travels. It is unique because it is one of those themes
about which there is never a lukewarm feeling. Emotions always run
high - whether one engages the embargo, the personalities involved,
the governing philosophy of the isla (island), or the veracity of the
data on health, information or welfare. There is no such thing as a
neutral feeling about the Perla de las Antillas (Pearl of the Antilles).
In the almost fifty years since Fidel Castro rose to power,
conversations about the country's realities epitomize the country's
paradoxes. Depending on political inclinations, people from the
North and the South alike describe the island as either paradise or
perdition; a magnificently successful or wholly failed experiment.
Mabie, Levin & Mabie Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College
of Law. Many thanks to Dean Al Garcia, Professor Siegfried Wiessner, and the
students of the Intercultural Human Rights Law Review for their kind invitation to
participate in this exciting conference on the Cuban Embargo. Thanks also to
Nathalie Nozile for her research assistance and Karen Kays for her word
processing help. This talk is drawn, in part, from my past publications including
the following: Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol, Sanctions and Sovereignty: Analysis of
the Embargo Under International Legal Norms, Special Pullout Section, in N.Y.
L.J. 215 (2/20/96): S4 (col. 1); JUST TRADE: A NEW COVENANT LINKING TRADE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS (with Stephen Powell) (NYU PRESS, New
York, 2008); Out in Left Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 15-117 (1994); Cuba and Good Governance, Symposium: Whither
Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development, 14 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 655-683 (2004); Building Bridges V- Cubans Without
Borders: Mujeres Unidas por Su Historia (Women United by Their History), 55
FLA. L. REV. 225-268 (2003); and Human Rights through a Gendered Lens:
Emergence, Evolution, Revolution, in I WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 3-39 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., Transnational Publishers,
Inc., New York, 1999).
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Experts in all relevant fields - whether it be economics or law -
utilize the same data (substantiated or not) and depending on their
political leanings, either praise the successes or decry the failures of
the system.
Supporters of the revolution and Castro loyalists (which now
means, first Fidel and then Rafil) cite to successes in health,
education, and welfare data that rival those of developed states and
place Cuba in the list of high development states as evidence of the
wonders of the regime.' They also point to constitutionally
mandated race and sex equality that promotes - indeed demands -
participation from all in not only the political process and productive
arenas but also in the reproductive sphere which results in child care,
health care, and education for all.2 Finally, other gems commonly
showcased to confirm the desirability of the regime include a
thriving tourism industry that promises visitors access to some of the
most beautiful beaches in the world and cutting-edge medical
training that supporters note serves not only the people of Cuba but
many around the world who benefit from Cuba's generosity in
sharing its doctors as well as its medical training. 3 This, they say, is
paradise.
On the other hand, foes of the revolution have blamed Fidel,
and now his brother, for severe shortages in food and electricity and
the crumbling infrastructure which was most recently evidenced by
the physical destruction that occurred in the island in 2008 as the
result of being hit by two major hurricanes, Gustav and Ike, within a
l See e.g., United Nation's Children's Fund, The State of the World's Children
2007 (2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/sowc07/docs/sowc07.pdf (Table 2
figures [pp 106-109] establish that only 5% of the children in Cuba have low birth
weights while the figure for the U.S. is 8%. Table 3 [pp 110-113] shows that in
Cuba 91% of the population uses improved drinking water and 98% has adequate
sanitation facilities; table 5 [pp. 118-121 ] establishes a 100% literacy rate for both
men and women; Table 8 [pp. 130-133] reveals a 100% antenatal care coverage
and skilled attendant at delivery rate; Table 10 [pp. 138-141] shows the same rank
as the U.S. A. for under age 5 mortality).
2 CUBAN CONST. art. 41-44, available at www.cubannet.org/ref/dis/const92e.
htm.
3 Sarah van Gelder, Cuba's Cure, YES! MAGAZINE, Summer 2007, available
at http://www.yesmagazine.org/article.asp?ID 1733.
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few weeks.4 Cuba reported the damage caused by these hurricanes at
approximately U.S. $5 billion.5 Beyond that, while questioning or
outright refuting the data that suggests successes in health and
education, the revolution's antagonists also cite to the island's
economic stagnation and widespread denial of civil and political
rights - such as the right to vote, lack of respect for free speech, lack
of an independent judiciary, the inability to travel freely - as
evidence of Cuba's blanket demise of fundamental human rights
which confirms its misguided and corrupt course. This, they say, is
perdition.
In the middle of this debate squarely sits the elephant in the
room: the almost fifty-year old U.S. economic policy towards Cuba -
the embargo that is the topic of this essay. Indeed, not even on the
naming of the economic policy can the camps agree. To those
antagonistic to the revolution the policy is an embargo - an
economic sanction constituting a legitimate government action that
legally restricts the flow of goods, services and capital to the island
in order to try to influence the Castro regime into changing its
undemocratic ways. Such lawful restrictions simply signal
justifiable disapproval of another country's policy with the goal of
changing the state's behavior that is perceived as a threat to the
sanction-imposing state's national security or economic well-being.
To those supportive of the regime, however, the U.S. action is a
"blockade," an illegitimate use of power to try to make the state
march to a different tune - one not of its own sovereign imagination
or desire.
From an internationalist's perspective, two sticky points of the
U.S. policy stand out. One is its express extraterritorial reach aimed
4 Summary on hurricane damage in Cuba and outlook on recovery, HAVANA
JOURNAL, Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://havanajoumal.com/politics/entry/
summary-on-hurricane-damage-in-cuba-and-outlook-on-recovery/ (reporting that
the hurricanes damaged over 320,000 homes, destroyed agricultural production
and crops, displaced over two million persons, damaged the health care
infrastructure, and damaged utilities.).
5 Hurricane damage in Cuba reaches US $5 billion, CARIBBEAN360.coM,
Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.caribbean360.com/News/Caribbean/
Stories/2008/09/17/NEWS0000006330.html (last visited May 2, 2009).
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at regulating the conduct of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies
which, under international legal principles, are nationals of the state
of incorporation and not U.S. nationals. The other is the tension of
the sanctions with the idea of free trade central to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and also embraced by the North American Free Trade
Agreement governing U.S.-Canada-Mexico trade. Opponents claim
that the extraterritorial reach of and the barriers to trade created by
the embargo violate international law. Moreover, it has a disastrous
impact on the people of Cuba including establishing a roadblock to
feeding the hungry or treating the sick.6 On the other hand,
proponents of the policy argue that it is a perfectly legitimate
exercise of sovereignty by the world's only surviving superpower
with the valid and laudable objective of strangulating an already
failed economy and bringing democracy (and thus freedom) to the
people of Cuba.7
Two other observations are noteworthy about the embargo. One
is that the Cuban community in the U.S., a politically powerful and
usually united force, is deeply divided on the embargo issue,
especially with respect to the most recent regulations enlarging the
limitations on remittances and family travel to Cuba. Second is that
while the Cuban community generally has been embraced in the U.S.
as a model minority - although that has more to do with the Cold
War politics that praise capitalism and denounce communism than
with any impetus of non-discrimination - many in the Midwest who
want to trade their agricultural products have joined the international
community's (including many states with a long history of alignment
with the U.S.) condemnation of the U.S. action as an invalid exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction and thus an impermissible infringement
of states' sovereignty.
This essay will evaluate the embargo and its consequences in
6 Anthony F. Kirkpatrick, Role of the USA in shortage offood and medicine in
Cuba, in The Lancet, Nov. 30, 1996, at pg 1489-1491, available at
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/P1 ISO 140-6736(96)07376-
X/abstract.
7 See Helen Osieja, Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign
Policy, 58 (Aug. 2005) (Ph.D. dissertation, American University of London).
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three parts. First, it briefly sets out the Human Rights framework
within which this work scrutinizes the embargo. Following it
presents a brief history of Cuba-U.S. relations including the creation
and progression of the economic sanctions the U.S. has imposed on
the neighboring island. Next, the essay evaluates the legality of the
sanctions and concludes with a critical analysis of the impact of the
sanctions.
II. The Human Rights Framework
The contemporary notion of international human rights8 is a
relatively new concept that emerged, in its present framework, after
the devastation caused by Second World War. However, the origins
of human rights' law can be traced to much earlier times, including
Greek stoicism. It has roots in natural law philosophy. 9 Locke
observed "certain rights self-evidently pertain to individuals as
human beings ... that, chief among them are the rights to life,
liberty... and property.10 However, what is now "known as human
rights to life, liberty, and equality were unformulated until the last
decades of the eighteenth century."
11
Human Rights are those trappings essential to the individual's
existence. Such rights "are fundamental, inviolable, interdependent,
8 See Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Human Rights through a Gendered
Lens, in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 3-39 (Kelly D. Askin &
Dorean M. Koenig eds., Transnational Publishers, Inc., New York, 1999)
[hereinafter Gendered Lens], at 6: There are arguments that human rights are not
universal but rather that they are culturally contingent. While it is important to note
the universality/relativism debate, it is beyond the scope of this work to delve into
such debate. Moreover, there is a framework that critiques the use of "rights"
language. See also, Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal
Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE (Brown & Halley, eds., Duke
University Press 2002).
9 Gendered Lens, at 6.
10 Id. (quoting Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA at 20 ( 1 5th ed., 1985), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY
at 22 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).
11 Id. discussion at 11.
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indivisible, and inalienable; 12 they are central to our self; moral,
social, religious, legal, and political rights that concern respect and
dignity associated with personhood, with a human beings'
identity. ' 13 The origins of human rights are traced to "religion,
natural law, and contemporary moral values."
14
Following the First World War, the League of Nations was born
with the purpose of maintaining international peace. 15 This was a
time when the rival states recognized an overarching need to protect
the rights of different ethnic, racial, and religious minority groups -
often groups created by the shifting of national boundaries as a result
of the war. Thus, even before the development of the modern human
rights framework and its non-discrimination ideals, states entered
into treaties with the goal of protecting minority rights. 16 However,
those treaties often were honored in the breach. Human rights
violations within each state's borders continued and ultimately the
gravest of abuses led to World War II.
After the Second World War, in 1945 the victors and others
who joined them assembled in San Francisco, participated in the
United Nations Conference on International Organization, and
established the United Nations. Those nations signed the United
Nations Charter ("the Charter"). The Member States "resolved to
combine [their] efforts"' 17
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women ... and to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom.., and for these
12 Id. at 5.
13 id.
14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 701 cmt. b (1987).
15 Id. at cmt. d.
16 See e.g., Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J.
(Ser. A./B.) No. 64, at 26 (Apr. 6, 1935) (seeking to protect the religious,
linguistic, and educational rights of the Greek minority in Albania), available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/193 5.04.06_albania/.
17 U.N. Charter preamble.
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ends .. to employ international machinery for the
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all
peoples .... 18
The Charter embraces the natural rights notion that certain
rights and freedoms of persons are fundamental and that States can
neither give them nor take them away.' 9 As such, one of the
Charter's purposes is to "encourage respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion..., 2 0
Soon after the formation of the United Nations, on December
10, 1948, the General Assembly (GA) adopted and proclaimed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ('the Declaration"). 21 After
its adoption, the GA asked the Member States to make the text of the
Declaration known and "to cause it to be disseminated, displayed,
read and expounded principally in schools and other educational
institutions, without distinction based on the political status of
countries or territories. 22
The Declaration is a comprehensive document embracing, like
the Charter, a natural law approach, and detailing civil and political
rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. The
Declaration's preamble plainly states that the "recognition of the
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world., 23 Member States commit to "the promotion
of universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. 24  The enumerated rights include many
8 Id.
19 See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 62, para. 2. (noting that the Economic and Social
Council may make recommendations to promote "respect for ... human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all"); see also Gendered Lens, supra note 8, at 15.
20 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://un.org/Overview/rights.html.
22 Id.
23 Id. at preamble.
24 id.
20091
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rights and freedoms directly pertinent to a conversation about Cuba.
The Declaration includes the rights to equality,25  non-
discrimination, 26 "life, liberty and the security of person",27 freedom
28 29
of religion, freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly
and association,30 freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each State, as well as the freedom "to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country." 31 The Declaration
also prohibits slavery32 and torture,33 and provides for a plethora of
procedural rights34 including the right to a fair trial. It forbids
interference with privacy 35 and confirms the right to own property.
36
Significantly, it sets out the right to participate in government37 as
well as the rights to health 38 and education.
As with the Charter, there are ongoing debates about whether
the Declaration is binding on the Member Sates. Notwithstanding
such discussions, based on international legal principles, many
academics have concluded that the Declaration is a legally binding
instrument in part, if not in whole. Scholars observe that domestic
and international legal developments support the status of the
declaration as a "statement of customary international law" 39 even if
when first drafted it was hortatory.
The drafters of the Declaration envisioned it as a blueprint for
the drafting and conclusion of one covenant that would embrace, in a
25 Id. at art. 1.
26 Id. at art. 2.
27 Id. at art. 3.
28 Id. at art. 18.
29 Id. at art. 19.
30 Id. at art. 20.
31 Id. at art. 13.
32 Id. at art. 4
" Id. at art. 5
14 Id. at arts. 7-11.
15 Id. at art. 12.
36 Id. at art. 17.
37 Id. at art. 21.
38 Id. at art. 25.
39 See Gendered Lens, supra note 8, at 19.
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legally binding and unitary way, the rights articulated in the
Declaration. These would include the so-called "first generation"
civil and political rights (such as the right to vote, travel, personhood,
privacy, freedom of thought, peaceful assembly, association and
religion) as well as the so-called "second generation" economic,
social and cultural rights (such as health, education, work, social
security, food, clothing, housing, and adequate standard of living).
However, the dream of one covenant was foiled by the geopolitical
interests of States. The so-called "First" World- the industrial states
- sought to give primacy to the negative civil and political rights
40
those rights that created in individuals the right to be free from
governmental interference and require no positive action by the
State. On the other hand, the then-Second World (the
communist/socialist states) and Third-World (the developing states
most of which were just emerging from the shackles of colonialism)
were primarily concerned with social and economic well-being and
thus wanted to give primacy to the economic, social and cultural
rights of their citizenry - rights which would create State obligations
to act in a positive manner in order to give effect to the rights.
Because of such divergent world views, the goal of a unitary, all
encompassing covenant failed and, instead, the articulation of rights
found in the Declaration was bifurcated into two treaties each
reflecting the divided world view as to which set of rights ought to
be given pre-eminence: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights41 ("ICCPR") and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights42 ("ICESCR"). Significant for
this work, the tension that emerged with respect to giving
hierarchical preference to first or second generation rights that
resulted in the bifurcation still exists today and is palpable in the
Cuba-U.S. frictions. The U.S. then gave and now still gives primacy
to civil and political rights. Cuba, on the other hand, takes the
position originally taken by the Communist States and the
40 Id. at 26.
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
42 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
20091
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Developing World, and ranks the social, economic, and cultural
rights higher than civil and political rights.
Three final comments are necessary before concluding this brief
presentation of the human rights framework. One is that the
development and adoption of the human rights framework have had
two major consequences in the international field. The first
consequence, as was plainly articulated in the Nuremberg
Judgment,43  there now exists individual responsibility for
international wrongs. This had the dramatic consequence of
transforming individuals from being mere objects of international
law to being subjects of international law. The second consequence
is that rights, at least jus cogens rights44 which are those rights
viewed "by the international community of States as a whole" as
fundamental principles or peremptory norms from which there can
be no derogation, are supra-sovereign. These norms include, for
example, prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and torture.
45
The second comment is that I eschew even the possibility of a
hierarchy of importance rights (with the exception of jus cogens
norms) with respect to the civil and political rights versus social,
economic and cultural rights. Rather, I fully embrace the
indivisibility/interdependence of rights paradigm which is
established in and by the Declaration as well as the covenants
themselves. Indeed, the Preamble to the ICCPR expressly
recognizes that "the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his
[/her] civil and political rights, as well as his [/her] economic, social
43 Judgment of Nuremberg Tribunal, International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg (1946), 41 AM. J. INT. L. 172 (1947).
44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
45 See e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, (July
21, 2000); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002
S.C.C. 1 (Jan. 11, 2002); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d
699 (9 th Cir. 1992); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. § 702 (1987).
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and cultural rights." In parallel fashion, the Preambular language of
the ICESCR provides that "the ideal of free human beings enjoying
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are
created whereby everyone may enjoy his [/her] economic, social and
cultural rights, as well as his [/her] civil and political rights."
Last, I do not want the reader to conclude that because I utilize a
human rights based analytical framework to scrutinize and challenge
the legal and moral validity of the embargo, such a framework, in its
traditional formulation, is unproblematic. To the contrary, I, as well
as others, have engaged in substantial critiques of the traditional
model as founded on a well-intended but limited vision as it is
imbued with Western/Northern, male, Christian, propertied (Class),
ability and heteropatriarchal biases. Thus, the analysis that follows
envisions an inclusive, pluralistic, culturally sensitive and egalitarian
(on grounds of race, sex, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, ability,
language and social origin) paradigm.
III. History of the Cuban Embargo
A. The Origins46
Cuba had been in the U.S. sphere of influence since its
independence from Spain until Castro's taking of power in 1959. At
the beginning of Castro's rule the U.S. welcomed what looked like a
government that would establish a Democratic state. Castro had
promised Constitutional rule, democratic elections and social
reforms. However, a quick change of course by the revolutionary
group who, among other things, established military tribunals for
political opponents and put hundreds in jail, resulted in chilly
relations commencing shortly after the revolution.
In 1960, President Eisenhower broke off relations with Cuba
when the Cuban government nationalized enterprises and property
located in the island that was owned by U.S. citizens.4 7  It is
46 BERTA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW
COVENANT LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 267-270 (2009).
47 See Kern Alexander & Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-
Socialist Cuba, 27 GEO. J. INT'L L. 137 (1995) (discussing the festering problems
20091
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noteworthy that these nationalizations were not a first action but
rather a reaction by Castro to a July 6, 1960, congressional
amendment to the Sugar Act of 1948 that permitted U.S. President
Eisenhower unilaterally to reduce the quota of sugar imported from
Cuba. The same day that Congress granted President Eisenhower
this discretionary power, he exercised it.
48
The same day that President Eisenhower reduced the sugar
quota, the Cuban Council of Ministers responded by adopting Law
No. 851, which characterized the U.S. action as an "act of
aggression." 49 The law gave the Cuban President and Prime Minister
the power to nationalize, by forced expropriation, property or
enterprises in which American nationals had an interest-a power
that Castro, too, immediately exercised, much like Eisenhower had
done in the United States with respect to the sugar quota.
The U.S. reaction to the nationalizations was two-fold. One, it
broke off relations with Cuba. Two, it sought to destabilize the
Castro regime. To achieve this second goal, in 1960 the United
States imposed an economic embargo on exports to Cuba and in
1962 imposed an embargo on imports. These actions were possible
under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 191750 (TWEA), which
allowed the President to act during peacetime and wartime
emergencies. In 1977, the TWEA was amended, prospectively, to
apply only in wartime. 51 However, the amendments grandparents in
any emergency declared prior to the enactment of the amendment
could be extended year by year. This move thus allowed the
regarding Cuba's expropriation of properties owned by the United States that led to
the severance of diplomatic relations between the two).
41 Sugar Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 86-593, 70 Stat. 330 (1960) (regulation
which granted President Eisenhower the discretionary power to unilaterally reduce
the quota of sugar imported to Cuba).
49 Cuban Law No. 851, Executive Power Resolution No. 1, Official Gazette
No. 16 (Special Issue), August 6, 1960; see also ELIHU LAUTERPACHT & C. J.
GREENWOOD, 66 I.L.R. 452 (1989).
50 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1917).
51 Trading With The Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 101(a), 102, and
103(b), 91 Stat. 1625, 1626 (1977). §§ 101(a), 102, and 103(b), 91 Stat. 1625,
1626 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b).
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grandparenting in of the U.S. embargo against Cuba.52 Every year
since the passing of the amendment, U.S. Presidents have extended
the embargo in the national interest.
In 1992, thirty years after the initial embargo, the Cuban
Democracy Act53  ("CDA" or "Torricelli Law") marked a
Congressional tightening of U.S. economic policy toward Cuba. The
most controversial of the CDA's provisions is the restoration of an
aspect of the 1962 embargo that had been repealed in 1975
prohibiting foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from doing
business with Cuba. The extraterritorial reach of the CDA's
provisions, including the prohibition concerning the acts of foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations, is at the heart of the virtually
universal challenge to their legality under accepted international
norms.
54
The international community has opposed the embargo in
general, and this provision in particular, on the basis of
impermissible interference with state sovereignty. Annually, since
1992 when the CDA was only pending in Congress, the European
Community (as the European Union (EU) was then known) has
objected in the U.N. General Assembly to the prohibition of foreign-
owned subsidiaries, incorporated and domiciled outside the United
States, from trading with Cuba.55 The basis of the objection is that,
under international law, the nationality of a corporate entity is the
state of its incorporation. By including wholly owned subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations in the jurisdictional reach of the CDA, the United
States is seeking to exercise jurisdiction over corporate entities that,
pursuant to international law, are foreign, that is, non-U.S.
corporations.
52 Id.; see also, Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1981).
53 Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1992).
54 22 U.S.C. §6002.
55 G.A. Res. 47/19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Nov. 24, 1992) (passing by a vote
of 59-3-71 and only states voting against were the United States, Israel, and
Romania, with such traditional U.S. allies as Canada and France voting in favor of
the resolution); see also 1992 U.N.Y.B. 234 (Yobert K. Shamapande ed., Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1993).
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Every year since the enactment of the CDA, the General
Assembly has adopted resolutions entitled "Necessity of Ending the
Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the
United States of America Against Cuba." The UNGA resolutions
provide that the General Assembly is "[c]oncerned about the
promulgation and application by Member States of laws and
regulations whose extraterritorial effects affect the sovereignty of
other States and the legitimate interests of entities or persons under
their jurisdiction, as well as the freedom of trade and navigation.' 56
The resolutions call upon "States to refrain from promulgating and
applying laws and measures of the kind" and urge the repeal of such
laws.
57
On March 12, 1996, approximately four years after the
enactment of the CDA, President Bill Clinton signed into law the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad),58
commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act. This Act codified into
law the economic sanctions against Cuba that had been imposed by
executive orders issued by previous presidents under the TWEA. It
not only strengthened the embargo, but it also established a cause of
action for U.S. nationals, including former Cuban nationals who are
now U.S. citizens, who lost property or assets in the
nationalization. 59 The Act also prohibits trafficking in confiscated
property and allows the denial of visas for entry into the United
States to anyone who traffics in nationalized property. It states as
its clear goal the bringing down of the Communist regime.
6 1
Most recently in the U.S.-Cuba conundrum, the Bush
Administration established the Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba ("the Commission") in order to identify several ways in which
the United States may hasten the fall of the Castro regime.62 The
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton Act) Act of
1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021-6091 (1996).
59 Id. at § 6081.
60 Id. at §§ 6081 and 6091.
61 Id. at § 6021.
62 u.S. Dep't of State, The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba,
HeinOnline  -- 4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 66 2009
EMBARGO OR BLOCKADE?
Commission was spearheaded by former Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Tom Ridge, then Secretary of Homeland Security, and
Condoleezza Rice, then Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, among others.63 The Commission proposed many
amendments to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR") 64
and on May 6, 2004, the CACR was amended to reflect the proposed
changes.65 The amendments focused primarily on further restricting
travel and remittances to Cuba.
The Commission's report to President Bush proposed many
ways for the United States to help the Cuban people transition from a
Castro Government to a democratically elected government. The
following six "inter-related tasks" were deemed to be essential to this
goal: "to empower Cuban civil society; to break the Cuban
dictatorship's information blockade; to deny resources to the Cuban
dictatorship; to illuminate the reality of Castro's Cuba; to encourage
international efforts to support Cuban civil society and challenge the
Castro regime; and to undermine the regime's succession strategy."
66
In the report, the Commission highlighted many reasons for the
strict recommendations. For instance, with respect to travel, the
Commission found that many academic institutions abused the
specific licenses granted for educational travel by organizing "study-
tour programs" to Cuba and engaging in largely tourist activities with
little interactions with the Cuban people.67 Consequently, the new
http://www.cafc.gov/mission/index.htm (last accessed May 2, 1999)
("The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba was established as a Cabinet-
level Commission on October 10, 2003 to explore ways the U.S. could help hasten
and ease a democratic transition in Cuba").
63 U.S. Dep't of State, Report to the Pres., Commission for Assistance to a
Free Cuba (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
32334.pdf [hereinafter Commission Report].
64 Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2004).
65 Revocation of OFAC Specific Licenses to Engage in Travel-Related
Transactions Incident to Visiting Close Relatives in Cuba, Notice, 69 Fed. Reg.
115 (June 16, 2004) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 515) [hereinafter OFAC].
66 See Commission Report, supra note 63, at 15 (The impetus behind the more
draconian regulatory framework was, as was the defined goal of the Helms-Burton
law, to render Castro's fall imminent).
61 Id. at 30.
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recommendations advocated limiting educational travel only to full-
semester programs, or to programs of shorter duration only when the
program specifically promotes United States policies.
68
Similarly, with respect to remittances the Commission estimated
the yearly total of the money sent to Cuba at $400 to $800 million
with some estimating the figure to be up to $1 billion.69  The
Commission found that the Cuban government generated $1 billion a
year in funds and goods sent to Cuba.70 Thus, the Commission
sought to curtail what it termed is a "revenue stream" to the Castro
regime by dramatically reducing the remittance amounts and limiting
the persons who are eligible to receive remittances to those
designated as "immediate family.'"7  Moreover, the Commission
found that the Cuban government retained between seventy-five to
eighty percent of the remittances sent to Cuba due in large part to
their monopoly of Cuba's "Tiendas para la Recuperaci6n de
Divisas," otherwise known as "dollar stores. 7 2 Consequently, the
remittances that were being sent with the goal of helping family
members effectively were serving to the benefit of the government.
The Commission made an additional observation in support of
its recommendation to restrict travel. The Commission estimated
that in 2003, under the previous regulations which allowed Cubans to
"commute" between the United States and Cuba, v3 the Cuban
government generated $96.3 million from family visits from the
United States to Cuba.7 4  Prior to the Commission's proposed
amendments, Cubans in the United States with a general license
could visit their close relatives (then defined to include second
cousins) once every twelve months. In addition, those who "share a
common dwelling as a family" were allowed to accompany the
68 Id. at 32.
69 Id.




74 Id. at 37.
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traveler on his/her visit to Cuba.75
Finally, the Commission also recommended that the U.S.
government enforce Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act. This action
would result in denying visas to those found to have engaged in the
"trafficking" of confiscated property of United States citizens or
residents.
76
Following the Commission's recommendations, the 2004
amendments substantially restricted family and educational travels
to Cuba as well as greatly limited remittances. The following are
some of the major changes that were implemented with respect to
travel. Under the Bush era regulations, instead of a general license,
travelers under the United States jurisdiction would be issued
specific licenses that authorized transactions related to immediate
family visits to Cuba.77 Moreover, travel was, for the most part,
restricted to people with "immediate family" who are Cuban
nationals. 78 "Immediate family" was narrowly defined as "a spouse,
child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or sibling of that person or
that persons' spouse, as well as any spouse, widow or widower of
any of the foregoing.,
79
The new regulations also provided that visitors may not stay for
a period longer than fourteen (14) days and could only visit every
three years. The three year period runs from the time the visitor last
left Cuba and no additional visits would be permitted even if an
intervening health or other emergency arose.
80
Beyond regulating who can travel, under what conditions, and
with what frequency, the regulations imposed other travel-related
restrictions. For example, the regulations limited the amount of
money travelers to Cuba could spend per day up to $50 per day,
dramatically reduced from the $164 per day travelers previously
75 See OFAC, supra note 65.
76 See Commission Report, supra note 63, at 42-44; see also 22 U.S.C. § 6021.
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could spend. 81 Travelers were allowed to spend an additional $50 for
transportation-related expenses within Cuba, if such travels exceeded
the initial $50 per day limit.8 2 In addition, the regulations prohibited
the so-called "fully-hosted travel" where travel expenses were paid
by a third-party not subject to the United States jurisdiction's
limitations.83 The regulations even restricted travelers to carrying one
piece of luggage that did not exceed a forty-four pound maximum
unless the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of
Commerce pre-authorized a higher amount.
84
In addition to the travel restrictions, the 2004 regulations
amended the rules concerning any remittances to be sent to Cuba.
The old regulations permitted $300 quarterly allowances to be sent to
any Cuban national from anyone who is under U.S. jurisdiction and
is at least eighteen years of age. The amendments authorized
remittances to be sent only to members of the sender's "immediate
family" per recipient household, regardless of the size of the
household. 85 Moreover, the regulations prohibited the sending of
remittances to certain government officials and members of the
Cuban Communist Party.86 The new regulations also reduced the
total amount of money of quarterly remittances a visitor is allowed to
take to Cuba from $3,000 to $300. 87 All these limitations were
aimed at toppling the government by limiting an income stream with
the goal of making Cuba shift to a democratic form of government.
Significantly the Obama administration in an April 13, 2009
press release on "Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Cuba"
announced the lifting of both travel restrictions, and remittance
restrictions. Specifically, the President ordered the lifting of
"restrictions on travel-related transactions for visits to a person's




84 Id. at 33769.
85 Id. at 33773.
86 Id. at 33770.
87 id.
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authorized by a general license. Cuban-Americans can visit family
"within three degrees of family relationship" and allows "individuals
who share a common dwelling as a family with an authorized
traveler to accompany them. The new procedures remove limitations
on frequency and length of visits.
88
Similarly the new regulations remove restrictions on
remittances to family member within the same degrees of family
relationship. However, the prohibition continues on remittances "to
currently prohibited members of the Government of Cuba or
currently prohibited members of the Cuban Communist Party."
Limits on frequency and amounts of remittances have been removed
and travelers may "carry up to $3,000.00 in remittances. '"8 9
While these measures do not affect the more general embargo, it
is noteworthy that the regulations authorize U.S. telecommunication
firms "to enter into agreements to establish fiber optic cables and
satellite telecommunication facilities." 90  Moreover,
telecommunication service providers can obtain licenses to enter into
roaming service agreements with Cuba providers; 9' satellite radio
and television service providers can obtain licenses to "engage in
transactions necessary to provide services to customers in Cuba;"
92
and persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction can obtain licenses "to
activate and pay U.S. and third-country service providers "for
telecommunication, satellite radio and TV services to persons in
Cuba except certain senior government and communist officials.
93
The new approach also permits; so long as consistent with national
security, "the export and reexport... of donated.., devices such as
mobile phone systems, computers and software .... 94
88 Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Promoting Democracy and
Human Rights in Cuba, § a (April 13, 2009), available at http://www.capitolhill
cubans.com/2009/04/obama-memorandum-promoting-democracy.htm1.
'9 Id. at § b.
90 Id. at § c.
91 Id. at § d.
92 Id. at § e.
93 Id. at § f.
94 Id. at § g.
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Finally, the new policy "expand[s] the scope of humanitarian
donations eligible for export through license exceptions.95 This
restores "clothing, hygiene items, seeds, veterinary medicines and
supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making
equipment" to the existing list.
The United States is not the only country that has enacted an
economic embargo against Cuba although it is the only one currently
in effect. The 1962 Proclamation of the Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the OAS, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, allowed for
the United States and other countries to impose an economic
embargo against Cuba. 96 However, in 1975, in the 16th meeting of
the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS, the
group adopted a resolution to permit individual members to
reestablish relations with Cuba pursuant to national interests and
policy. 97  Since that resolution was passed, virtually every OAS
member has established relations with Cuba-both diplomatic and
economic. Moreover, in August 1996, an OAS Committee declared
that the Helms-Burton Act was illegal as it sought to exercise
jurisdiction in a manner contrary to international norms.
B. Legality of Sanctions
1. Helms-Burton Act and Customary International Law
98
The controversial provisions of the Helms-Burton Act include
Title III, which allows U.S. nationals to seek compensation in U.S.
courts for property losses from Castro's expropriations, and Title
IV's denial of U.S. entry to foreign nationals who "traffic" in such
95 Id. at § h.
96 Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 3, 1962) (noting that "the
present government of Cuba is incompatible with the principles and objectives of
the Inter-American system").
97 Freedom of Action of the States Parties to the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance to Normalize or Conduct Their Relations with the Republic
of Cuba at the Level and in the Form that Each State Deems Advisable, O.A.S.
Resolution, July 29, 1975, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. G.C.P./Doc. 9/75, 14 I.L.M.
1354 (1975).
98 HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 46, at 269.
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expropriated property of a U.S. citizen. 99 In this case, the legality of
a unilateral economic sanction turns on the nature of the legal
system-civil or common law-used to analyze the embargo.
Common law systems hold that it is appropriate to apply national law
to activities that occur outside state territory if there is a substantial
relationship between the law and the foreign activity. Civil law
doctrine, on the other hand, would never find appropriate application
of national circuit laws outside the national territory without some
national interest nexus. 00
Customary international law supports the "objective territorial
principle" as articulated in the United States v. Baker 0 1 case. A
State has jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to foreign activity that
has substantially negative effects within its territory. 10 2  An
American Bar Association (ABA) Recommendation on the subject
also provides that the substantial effects test is part of the territorial
principle. 10 3 Significantly, the Recommendation does not challenge
basing sanctions on extra-territorial action, only on applying those
sanctions to a company that is, in fact, a national of another state
through its incorporation elsewhere, even if it is a wholly owned
subsidiary of a U.S. company.
2. WTO Legality of U.S. Sanctions against Cuba10 4
Title IV's effects on the ability of European corporations doing
business in Cuba-most of them subsidiaries of U.S. firms-
thereafter to trade with the United States, led the European
99 22 U.S.C. § 6021.
100 See generally GARY BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (4th ed. 2007).
101 U.S. v. Baker, 609 F. 2d 134 at 138 (5thCir. 1980).
102 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §402 (2008) (providing that "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe
law with respect to ... (c) conduct outside in its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory ...").
103 Timothy L. Dickinson, Resolution and Report on Extraterritorial
Economic Sanctions, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. OF INT'L LAW AND PRACTICE 10.
104 HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 46, at 269-270.
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Commission to challenge Helms-Burton as violative of the non-
discrimination provisions of the GATT's Four Pillars.' 0 5 The United
States announced that its actions were justified under GATT Article
XXI as national security measures and that, because that Article left
national security measures to the sole discretion of each Member, a
WTO dispute settlement panel would have nothing to decide.'
0 6
Article XXI(b)(iii) provides that "nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed ... to prevent [a WTO Member] from taking any
action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests .. taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations (emphasis added)." Legal experts disagree
whether this standard is self-judging. On the one hand, some claim
that the drafters could not have intended to leave to the complete
discretion of Members any action taken under Article XXI. In
support of this interpretation they refer to the term "emergency in
international relations" which ostensibly describes an extreme and
unusual occurrence that is plainly subject to evaluation by dispute
panels. 10 7 In the case of the U.S. embargo on Cuba, unless the U.S.
declares war against Cuba, the U.S. has to establish an emergency in
international relations. Under this theory, the emergency must be
interpreted as having a close relationship to war. Another reason to
suggest that no emergency in international relations exists with
respect to the embargo is the consistent vote by the U.N. General
Assembly against the U.S. embargo of Cuba. From such a
perspective, Cuba's shooting down of an aircraft flown by Cuban
exiles in 1996 can not be translated either to a declaration of or an act
of war. 10 Rather, as a matter of law-although clearly not as a
matter of politics-that occurrence is a relatively minor incident that
cannot be considered an international wrong by Cuba. To be sure,
105 HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 46, at 26-48.
106 U.S. Government Continues to Seek Compromise with Europe on Cuba
Affair (Helms-Burton Act) But, If It Fails, It Will Refuse WTO Panel Competence,
REUTER AGENCY EUROPE, Feb. 22, 1997.
107 Kees Jan Kuilwijk, Castro's Cuba and the U.S. Helms-Burton Act: An
Interpretation of the GATT Security Exemption, 31 J.W.T. 49, 52-53 (1997).
10' See generally, Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla.
1997).
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the other side - in the EU-U.S. dispute the position taken by the U.S.
- contends that, because Article XXI is on its face self-judging, there
can be no interpretive role for a dispute panel and assumption of
jurisdiction over such a measure thus serves no purpose.109
There has been no resolution of the debate on these theories of
the appropriate interpretation of GATT Article XXI. The United
States and Europe settled the dispute that would have provided the
answer by the U.S. agreeing that the President would waive
application of Title IV, as the U.S. Congress had authorized him to
do. It is noteworthy that one of President Bush's Commission's
recommendations was to put an end to such waiver.
IV A Critique - The Effects of the Embargo from a Social Justice
Perspective"
0
It is common knowledge that trade sanctions hurt workers and
industries, not the officials who authored the policies that are the
target of the sanctions. The countries most likely to face sanctions
are those run by undemocratic governments least likely to let the
pain of their population sway them. These observations hold true in
the case of the U.S. embargo on Cuba.
While in nearly fifty years of the embargo the purported goal of
achieving democracy in Cuba has not been met, the embargo has had
deleterious effects on Cuba and the Cuban people. First, a look at
some factual data in light of trade relation confirms the reality and
extent of the harms suffered. In 1958, the United States accounted
for 6 7 % of Cuba's exports and 7 0% of its imports, 1 1 placing it
109 Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the
GATT Says, and What the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 263,
268 (1998); see also Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle
Success or Rampant Failure?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1281 (2003).
110 HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 46, at 270-272.
... James Stamp & Jonathan Coleman, The Economic Impact of U.S.
Sanctions with Respect to Cuba, USITC Pub. 3398, Inv. No. 332-413 (Feb. 2001),
1-7, available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/pub3398.pdf (citing U.N.
Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survival of Latin America
1963 (New York: U.N. Dep't of Public Info., 1965), 273).
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seventh on both export and import markets of the United States.
112
In 1999, by contrast, official U.S. exports to Cuba totaled a paltry
$4.7 million, which was comprised mainly of donations of medical
aid, pharmaceuticals, and other forms of charitable aid. 13 In the year
2000, Cuba ranked 184th of 189 importers of U.S. agricultural
products. 1 14 The relaxation of sanctions against food and medicines
beginning in 2000 found Cuba rising to 138th in 2001 and to 26th in
2004 for U.S. export markets." 5 By 2006, Cuba's ranking had fallen
slightly to become the 33rd largest market for U.S. agricultural
exports (exports totaling $328 million). 1 6 The U.S. International
Trade Commission estimates an ongoing annual loss to all U.S.
exporters of approximately $1.2 billion for their inability to trade
with Cuba.
1 17
The Cuban government estimates that the total direct economic
impact caused by the embargo is $86 billion, which includes loss of
export earnings, additional costs for import, and a suppression of the
growth of the Cuban economy.' 18 However, various economic
researchers and the U.S. State Department discount the effect of the
embargo and suggest that the Cuban problem is one of lack of hard
foreign currency which renders Cuba unable to purchase goods it
needs in the open market.' 19
112 Id. (citing "Direction of Trade Statistics--Database and Browser," IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfn?sk-20954.0).
11' Id. at 1-11 (citing data compiled by U.S. Dep'ts of Commerce and the
Treasury).
114 U.S. Dep't of Agric., Foreign Agric. Serv., http://www.fas.usda.gov/
USTrade/USTEXFATUS.asp?Ql-(Iast visited Jun 13, 2007) (compiled from
Agricultural Export Commodity Aggregations).
115 id.
116 id.
117 Stamp & Coleman, supra note 111, at 2-19.
118 Felipe Perez Roque, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cuba, Statement to the
U.N. General Assembly: Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and
Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against Cuba, (Nov.
8, 2006), available at http://europa.cubaminrex.cu/English/Speeches/
FPR/2006/FPR 081106.htm.
119 Stamp & Coleman, supra note III, at 2-17 (citing Jaime Suchlicki,
Institute for Cuba and Cuban American Studies, University of Miami, "The U.S.
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That there has been an economic impact of the embargo is
evident to anyone who visits Cuba. For example, there is a
minuscule number of modern automobiles on the roads of Cuba.
Most are American vehicles from the late 1950s-prior to the
embargo (and the revolution). To be sure, because the law prohibits
ships from entering U.S. ports for six months after making deliveries
to Cuba, the policy effectively denies Cuba access to the U.S.
automobile market. 
120
However, the impacts of economic sanctions are greater than
lack of access to goods. In the case of Cuba, some argue that the
U.S. embargo has had a deleterious impact on nutrition and health
with a lack of availability of medicine and equipment, as well as
decreased water quality. 12 1 Indeed, the American Association for
World Health (AAWH), in a 1997 report, concluded that
the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the
health and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban
citizens.... [I]t is our expert medical opinion that the U.S.
embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering-and
even deaths-in Cuba .... A humanitarian catastrophe has
been averted only because the Cuban government has
maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health
care system designed to deliver primary and preventive
health care to all of its citizens. 1
22
Thus, AAWH concludes that the embargo, limiting availability
of food, medicine, and medical supplies, has a deleterious effect on
Embargo of Cuba," Occasional Paper Series (June 2000), 14); see also U.S. Dep't
of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Zenith and Eclipse: A Comparative
Look at Socio-Economic Conditions in Pre-Castro and Present Day Cuba (Feb. 9,
1998, rev. June 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/14776.htm.
120 Manuel Roig-Franzia, In Rural Cuba, a Slow Road to Progress Outside
Havana, Scarcity of Cars Makes Horse-Drawn Buggies the Way to Go, THE
WASHrNGTON POST, Sept. 28, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/27/AR2006092701878.html.
121 Am. Assn. for World Health Report, Denial of Food and Medicine: The
Impact of the U.S. Embargo on the Health and Nutrition in Cuba--An Executive
Summary (March 1997), available at http://www.cubasolidarity.net/aawh.html.
122 id.
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Cuban society. Significantly, religious leaders, including the late
Pope John Paul II, opposed the embargo and called for its end.
23
The gravamen of the objection is the humanitarian and economic
hardships that the embargo causes.
Interestingly, the new regulations implemented by the Bush
administration were met with criticism from many in the Cuban
community. While the new regulations purport to exert pressure on
Castro, many believe that these regulations only hurt Cuban-
Americans and their Cuba-based families. Some speculate that
President Bush's supporters for the new regulations are U.S. citizens
who no longer have relatives in Cuba. 124 For example, one of the
supporters of the new restrictions included a seventy-five year old
man who emigrated from Cuba in 1973. Opponents, however, were
mostly recent immigrants who still had many relatives in Cuba.
25
Because the implementation of the amendments occurred shortly
before the 2004 elections, many suspected that they would cause a
split among Cuban voters in the South Florida area who ordinarily
tend to vote Republican.
Four years after the implementation of the draconian regulations
Cubans continue to voice their disaffection with the interference with
their ability to send money to family or travel to Cuba. In Vilaseca v.
Paulson,126 a case filed in the United States District Court in
Vermont against Henry Paulson in his official capacity as the
Director of the U.S. treasury department, four citizens of Vermont
who have pressing needs to return to Cuba because of illness,
sickness, and death of family members, challenged the
constitutionality of the regulations. The complaint alleges that the
family travel regulations violate the Fifth Amendment of the United
123 Larry Rohter, Pope Condemns Embargo; Castro Attends Mass, NEW YORK
IMES, Jan. 26, 1998, available at http://salsa.babson.edu/Pages/Articles/98-
01%20Cuba%2OPope%20Condems%20Embarg.
124 Abby Goodnough & Terry Aguayo, Limits on trips to Cuba cause split in




126 Vilaseca v. Paulson, No. 2:08-CV-53 (D. Vt. filed March 20, 2008).
HeinOnline  -- 4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 78 2009
EMBARGO OR BLOCKADE?
States Constitution 127 and they seek an injunction preventing the
government from enforcing the regulation.
128
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") affiliates in
Vermont, Florida, and Massachusetts along with the Center for
Constitutional Rights, filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
Plaintiffs' complaint.1 29 In its brief, the ACLU maintains that the
regulations not only violate an individual's right to preserve and
maintain family as guaranteed by the First and Fifth amendments,
they also violate plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the United
States Constitution. 13  They argued that the right to family is a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that Cubans are
being deprived of that right.'3 '
The ACLU also argues that the regulations violate international
law. 1 32 Specifically, the argument posits that the regulations violate
established human rights. First, they infringe on the right to family
which is recognized as "the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the state."' 33 In
addition, they violate the "right to freedom of movement" 34 and the
"right to leave any country, including his[/her] own. 135  President
127 U.S. Const. amend. V. (providing, in relevant part, that: "No person shall.
be deprived of... liberty ... without due process of law..
128 Vilaseca Compl. No. 2:08-CV-53.
129 See American Civil Liberties Union, Press Release, ACLU of
Massachusetts Backs Suit Challenging Bush Administration Travel Restrictions on
Family Visits to Cuba (May 16, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/natsec/
travel/35675prs200805I6.html?s src-RSS.
130 Id. at 4.
131 id.
132 Id. at 5.
133 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 21, at art. 16(3); see
also ICCPR, supra note 41, at art. 23(1); see also ICESCR, supra note 42, at art.
10(1) (noting that the family "is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society").
134 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 21, at art. 13(1); see
also ICCPR, supra note 41, at art. 12(1) (noting that persons "lawfully within" a
state's territory has "the right to liberty of movement").
135 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 21, art. 13(2); see also
ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 12(2) ("Everyone shall be free to leave any country").
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Obama's changed approach, although a small step, goes quite far in
alleviating some of these concerns.
Thinking critically and deploying a social justice perspective,
there is a cruel irony to the availability of remittances in Cuba. To
be sure, remittances play a large economic welfare role throughout
the region. A recent report observed that "[a]t more than $50 billion
a year, family remittances are central to economic growth, national
expenditures, and balance of payments for many countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Remittances now exceed portfolio
investment, foreign aid, and government or private borrowing, and
they have proven to be remarkably stable, often increasing when
economies falter."' 36 As discussed above,137 remittances play a large
role in the economy of Cuba. The U.S. State Department estimates
that remittances range from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with
the great bulk coming from families in the United States. 138 A 2004
report on Cuban economic development confirms this range,
estimating that remittances to the island from U.S. residents totaled
approximately $900 million in 2003, which represented about 3% of
the country's GDP which would have "determinative influence on
the country's financial stability and on the level of consumption of
households."'1 39 These figures contrast with a survey of individuals
which placed the remittances in the $460 million range.
140
136 Peter Hakim, Making the Most of Family Remittances: Second Report of
the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on Remittances, INTER-AMERICAN
DIALOGUE, available at http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/2007/
spring/familyremittances.pdf.
137 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
131 U.S Dep't of State, Background Note: Cuba, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm (last visited June 7, 2007).
139 Jorge Pdrez-Lopz & Sergio Diaz-Briquets, Remittances to Cuba: A Survey
of Methods and Estimates, A.S.C.E. Proceedings 15, 396, 396-397 (2005) (quoting
Comisi6n Econ66a para America Latina y el Caribe, "Cuba: Evoluci6n econ6mica
durante 2003 y Perspectivas para 2004," LC/MEX/L.622 (2004), 2, available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/pdfs/volumel5/pdfs/diazbriquetsperezlopez.
pdf).
140 Id. at 397 (citing Bendixen and Associates, Remittances to Cubafrom the
United States, May 25, 2005); see also Nancy San Martin, "Flow of Funds to
Cuba Holds Steady," THE MIAMI HERALD, May 26, 2005 (citing Bendixen and
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Interestingly, notwithstanding the drastic reduction in
remittances effected by the 2004 regulations, a study showed that a
year after these were implemented the flow of funds to Cuba
remained unchanged. 141  However, although the more restrictive
regulations may not have in reality decreased the flow of funds to
Cuba, polls reveal that some Cubans believe they are receiving less
money. The most likely explanation for this phenomenon is that the
Cuban government is finding means to capture a greater percentage
of the money that is being sent.142  Thus the purpose of the
regulations, to keep money away from the government, is being
foiled. To be sure, given the figures, one has to wait and see if
President Obama's changes will have any effect at all, especially
concerning their stated goal of "promoting human rights and
democracy" in the island.
In light of the embargo, the existence and level of remittances is
Associates, "Remittances").
141 Nancy San Martin, Flow of Funds to Cuba Holds Steady, THE MIAMI
HERALD, May 26, 2005, available at http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y05/
jun05/01e5.htm.
142 Id. According to the survey, approximately 440,000 Cuban Americans
send $150 on an average of seven times per year, translating to about $1,050 a
year. This provides cash of approximately $460 million to Cuba. As noted above,
other estimates place the flow of all remittances as high as $1 billion. The
heightened regulations allow only up to $1,200 in cash remittances a year and only
to immediate family members, so no longer can monies be sent to grandparents,
cousins, or more distant relatives. One analyst estimates that the Cuban
government takes up to 20% of the remittances, partly from a 10% fee imposed in
2004 by the government on exchanges of dollars. Thus, 20% of an estimated $460
million in remittances amounts to $92 million that the remittances provide the
government. Id. (citing Bendixen and Associates, "Remittances"); see also
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC), Report to the President (May
2004), 34, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/32334.pdf
(noting that U.S. cash remittances to Cuba account for estimated $400 to $800
million per year with some estimates ranging as high as $1 billion); Marl P.
Sullivan, "Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances," Cong. Res. Serv.
Rep. at CRS-9 (upd. Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/83002.pdf (noting the restrictions on the remittances are regulated by
the Cuban Assets Control Regulation, which, pursuant to June 16, 2004,
amendments, limit the remittances to $300 per quarter to nationals of Cuba who
are members of the immediate family which is comprised of a spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent, or sibling).
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significant. The Cuban government benefits from the remittances by
permitting Cubans to shop in state-operated "dollar stores" which
sell food and other household necessities that are otherwise
unavailable in Cuba. These stores' sales are at high mark-ups-
sometimes estimated at over 240% of face value. 1
43
In an action consistent with the embargo policy and goals, the
Administration's June 2004 tightening of restrictions on remittances
also tightened allowed travel, potentially cutting off another source
of funds to the island. It is estimated that in 2003 there were 125,000
family visits to Cuba which resulted in approximately $96 million in
hard currency for the Cuban government. 44 Thus, the tightened
travel restrictions in both family and education categories work along
with the embargo in limiting the funds that reach the island.
However, this restriction, too, has been lifted by the new policy
which has laudable goals. Therefore, over the few months following
this policy change it will be interesting to see if it has any real,
practical effects on life in Cuba.
Remittances can be reconciled with the official policy of the
embargo - even the limited remittances under the new, more
restrictive regulations - on the premise that the sending of
remittances is a private, family affair. 45 Thus, while the embargo
seeks to strangle the weak Cuban economy on a statist level,
allowing private parties to make remittances to families can be
viewed as a private family affair into which government should not
intrude. Such perspective notwithstanding, one has to reconcile the
changing regulations with respect to remittances. To be sure, the
current decrease in levels of remittances allowed permit the United
States to acknowledge the private nature of the actions while seeking
to maintain a coherent foreign policy of not providing economic
support to the government of Cuba. Nonetheless, "[r]emittances are
helping to stabilize a society hurt by economic crisis and the
143 Background Note: Cuba, supra note 138.
144 See U.S. Dep't of State, Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
(CAFC), Report to the President (May 2004), 37, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/32334.pdf.
145 Making the Most of Family Remittances, supra note 136, at 3-4.
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inequalities generated by a bureaucratic power structure." 146  The
impact on family members in Cuba, as with remittances sent to other
parts of Latin America, is to help people, especially family members,
out of poverty-helping them "cope with austerity and scarcity" as
well as indirectly to strengthen the emerging market economy.147
Most significant, however, is the reality (as the study cited above
showed) that the flow of remittances, and consequently the flow of
money to the government by whatever means it institutes to capture
the hard currency, has not diminished.
V Conclusion: The Human (Rights) and Moral Dimension
This essay has presented the history of economic sanctions
against Cuba, analyzed the questionable legality of the sanctions, and
detailed the effects of the sanctions. In conclusion, I want to
problematize further the legality of the sanctions under international
law. To be sure, the U.S. commitment to the WTO limits its ability
to refuse to trade absent a legitimate, allowed concern. To use the
national security claim vis-a-vis Cuba simply does not pass the laugh
test; although the recent talks with Venezuela and the Russian fleet
might cause a reconsideration of that position. Moreover, save for
the regulations, which in any case are limited in light of the entirety
of the Toricelli and Helms Burton laws, the WTO is a "later in time"
statement of the law which should then govern.
The other aspect of legality involves the human rights idea.
146 Manuel Orozco, Challenges and Opportunities of Marketing Remittances
to Cuba (July 27, 2002), 15, in INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, available a
thttp://www.thedialogue.org/publications/countrystudies/remittances/Cuba remitt
ances.pdf.
147 Id; see also Lorena Barberia, Remittances To Cuba: An Evaluation of
Cuban and US Government Policy Measures, Rosemary Rogers Working Paper
Series (2002), available at http://web/mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/rrwp/15
remittances.doc (noting that "[i]n absolute terms remittances are as important for
Cuba's economy as they are for other countries in the Caribbean, roughly
equivalent to those received by the Dominican Republic and twice as high as those
received by Haiti. Indeed, a 1998 survey of Latin America immigrants' remittance
behavior found that the percentage of Cuban-Americans sending remittances is
higher than Mexican-Americans and lower than Dominican-Americans.").
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Here, the real impact on real people of the embargo borders on
unconscionable. As the essay has described, the actions have taken a
human toll; they affect health, hunger, education, nutrition quite
directly. They also affect the right to travel and the right to family
life of Cubans in the U.S. who can no longer visit their relatives with
regularity nor spend time with them in either times of joy or times of
need - although this has been changed dramatically by President
Obama' s policy shift.
Economic sanctions are valuable tools for protecting human
rights. The U.S. has used sanctions to discourage human rights
violations. Examples include the U.S. ban of South African gold
Krugerrands in 1985 to protest apartheid148 , the blockage of
Nicaraguan imports to deter terrorist acts of the Sandinista regime,
149
the prohibition of foreign aid to Burma to oppose the government's
use of forced labor,' 50 and the 1989 denial of MFN status against
China to protest the killing of pro-democracy protestors in
Tiananmen Square to name a few.' 
51
The U.S. is not alone in this approach. In fact, human rights
violations have resulted in states jointly taking economic sanctions
through the UN Security Council. Examples include NATO states'
1986 sanctions against Libya as a result of Moammar Ghadafi's
148 See Peterson Institute for International Economics, Case Studies in
Sanctions and Terrorism (noting the specific the following cases, Case 62-2, U.N.
v. South Africa (1962-1994: Apartheid; Namibia) and Case 85-1, U.S.,
Commonwealth v. South Africa (1985-91: Apartheid)) (2008), available at
http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/southafrica.cfm.
149 White House Statement, Economic Sanctions Against Nicaragua, May 1,
1985, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mlO79/is-v85/ai_3835076.
1' Leon T. Hadar, U.S. Sanctions Against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts,
CATO INSTITUTE CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES, Mar. 26, 1998, available at
http://www.freetrade.org/node/62.
151 See e.g., Hachett, David, China lobbyists worry over future MFN
prospects, FOOTWEAR NEWS, July 30, 1990; see also Shoff, Jim, China MFN
renewal hailed by importers, FOOTWEAR NEWS, May 28, 1990; see also Andrew
B. Brick, Bryan T. Johnson & Thomas Timmons, Washington's Agonizing
Decision: To Extend or to Revoke China's Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status,
ASIAN STUDIES BACKGROUNDER #104, May 8, 1990, available at
http;//www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/asbIO4.cfm.
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support for the terrorist killing of 279 passengers aboard a U.S.
airline bombed over Lockerbie and 1990 Iraq sanctions for its
invasion of Kuwait.
The Cuba sanctions, however, reflect another aspect of
economic sanctions: their deleterious and harmful effects on civil
society, the innocent citizenry of the targeted country. By depriving
citizens of the benefits of trade, of travel, of family life; by creating
circumstances in which people's health, nutrition, standard of living
and overall welfare are negatively affected, sanctions have effected
serious denials of human rights - a moral if not legal failure.
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